Interactive model · Expectation States Theory

Pecking Order Lab

Six agents with hidden, unequal abilities repeatedly pair off and play a coordination game: each round, either one backs down and lets the other lead, both back down at once, or neither does and a costly conflict breaks out. Nobody is optimizing — each agent follows a fixed, psychologically "hardwired" rule for forming expectations about who outranks whom, based on what they've personally experienced and what they've watched happen to others. The paper's central finding: these rules reliably stop conflict, but they only sometimes build a hierarchy that actually tracks ability — there's a tradeoff between sorting quickly and sorting correctly. Adjust the rules on the left and run the group to see where a given rule set lands on that tradeoff.

Sirianni, A. D. (2018). "Expectations and Coordination in Small Groups." Advances in Group Processes, Vol. 35, pp. 181–207. · DOI · source notebook

Payoff over time

Moving average of collective payoff per interaction, against the paper's own bounds: 1/2 for ability-blind coordination, 2/3 for a group that always lets the abler agent lead.

How interactions resolve

Share of each outcome type across the run, in 30 sequential windows.

Resources vs. ability

Final payoff earned by each agent (bars) against their underlying ability (markers). Bars tracking the markers means the hierarchy rewards the more able agent.

Expectation structure

Every pair's final standing: has it settled into a one-sided hierarchy, is it a stand-off, or still rivalrous?